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PERSPECTIVES: LAW IN THE GRAND 
MANNER 
Being a Supreme Court justice must have been more fun in 
the eighteenth century than it is today. The caseload was lighter, 
and the Court was a social as well as a political center. 1 The jus-
tices also apparently felt considerably less constrained by formal 
or informal rules of governance. In a single case in 1796, the 
Court violated virtually every rule of procedure and canon of con-
struction. Hylton v. United States2 is an obscure taxation case 
cited occasionally as an unilluminating pre-Marbury example of 
judicial review.3 It is a charming illustration of the nonchalance 
with which the early Court approached its constitutional duties. 
The case arrived at the Court only by the combined manipu-
lative efforts of the United States Attorney General, who argued 
the case for the United States but paid the attorneys' fees for Hyl-
ton; the "Attorney of the Virginia District," who prosecuted Hyl-
ton below but argued on his behalf in the Supreme Court; and 
such Virginia notables as Chief Justice Edmund Pendleton, ex-
Senator John Taylor, and the notorious Spencer Roane, all of 
whom refused, along with Hylton, to pay the disputed tax, but 
were less interested in seeing their names in the Supreme Court 
reports. Hylton himself, after confessing judgment at the circuit 
court level, declined to participate further.4 
The reporter's description of the case is rife with evidence of 
collusion. Hylton was alleged to have owned (for a period of less 
than four months, according to Justice Paterson's account) 125 
carriages for his own personal use, on which the federal govern-
ment levied a purportedly unconstitutional tax. Hylton's need for 
I. See, e.g., White, The Working Life of the Marshall Court, 1815-1835, 70 VA. L. 
REV. I (1984). 
2. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). The entire case is quite short, taking up fewer than 15 
pages in the original reports. In the interest of readability, therefore, no jump citations will 
be provided. All unidentified statements and quotations are from either the opinions of the 
justices or the reporter's syllabus. 
3. See, e.g., J. NoWAK, R. RoTUNDA & J. YouNG, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 13 (1983); 
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 20 (1978). Of course, there is no case too 
obscure, nor any issue too tedious, to escape the notice of our diligent constitutional histori-
ans. For thorough and exhaustive treatments of the merits of this obscure tax case, see J. 
GOEBEL, ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 (OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE 
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, VOL. I) 778-82 (1971); Currie, 
The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1789-1801, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 819, 853-60 (1981). 
4. See3 U.S. at 171-72 (reporter's syllabus); J. GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 779 & n.59. 
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such extravagant transportation is explained when one multiplies 
125 carriages by $16, the tax on each carriage: the calculation 
yields a conveniently exact $2000, the minimum amount then nec-
essary to obtain federal jurisdiction.s Hylton did not seem partic-
ularly concerned about his potential $2000 liability. According to 
the reporter, Hylton waived his right to a jury trial, submitted the 
case to the court on stipulated facts that went against him on every 
count, and then, when an equally divided court was unable to 
reach a decision, confessed judgment. He did not even await a 
retrial by a new circuit justice, for which Congress had presciently 
provided in the event of such judicial ties.6 Perhaps his carefree 
attitude stemmed from the government's stipulation that if judg-
ment were entered for the plaintiff for $2000, it would be "dis-
charged by the payment of 16 dollars, the amount of the duty and 
penalty." 
The reporter's account of the suit is straightforward and in-
genuous, with no attempt to disguise the collusive nature of the 
proceedings. He did not even bother to fill in the blank space left 
for the name of the other circuit justice who sat with Supreme 
Court Justice Wilson below. Perhaps he may be forgiven for 
overlooking such trivial matters, since he so carefully identifies the 
Supreme Court's reason for considering the case, "which (as well 
as the original proceeding) was brought merely to try the constitu-
tionality of the tax." Even the most activist member of the War-
ren Court might have blanched at so blatant an admission of 
jurisdictional overreaching. Or perhaps not-Justice Douglas 
might have considered it refreshingly frank. 
In order to decide the case, the Supreme Court had to over-
look not only the procedural errors below, but also the require-
ment of a quorum. Of the six justices then on the Court, only 
three managed to participate in the decision. Chief Justice Ells-
worth "was sworn into office, in the morning; but not having 
heard the whole of the argument, he declined taking any part in 
the decision in this cause." Justice Cushing, "hav[ing] been pre-
vented, by indisposition, from attending to the argument" thought 
it "improper to give an opinion on the merits of the cause." Jus-
tice Wilson had been the circuit justice below, and thus professed 
himself relieved that the unanimity of his brethren obviated the 
necessity of expressing an opinion. He did note, however, that his 
5. Goebel thinks the ruse was suggested by Hamilton; both Goebel and Currie point 
out that in fact the statute provides for federal jurisdiction only for amounts over $2000. J. 
GoEBEL, supra note 3, at 680; Currie, supra note 3, at 853. Even the deliberate procedural 
machinations were erroneous. 
6. See Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 2, I Stat. 333, 334. 
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"sentiments, in favor of the constitutionality of the tax in question 
[had] not been changed." If that sentimental annotation did not 
amount to an opinion-and he apparently did not mean it to-the 
remaining three justices (Chase, Paterson, and Iredell) did not 
constitute a quorum. 
The three justices who did venture opinions felt free to follow 
their own consciences. They certainly did not appear to be fol-
lowing much else. Justice Chase's three-page statement illustrates 
why judicial writings are called "opinions." His eighteen short 
paragraphs, when they are not mere restatements of the argu-
ments of the parties, convey as much confidence and certainty as 
most first-year law exams. He writes of the argument of the plain-
tiff in error that it "did not satisfy my mind," and that "I think, at 
least, that it may be doubted" This certainty of mind is echoed 
throughout the opinion: "I am inclined to think," "I believe," "It 
appears to me," "I admit that this mode might be adopted," "it 
seems to me," "I think," "it seems to me," and finally, "I am in-
clined to think, but of this I do not give a judicial opinion." 
Justice Paterson, on the other hand, is so sure of himself that 
he expresses views not only on the constitutionality of the tax but 
on the wisdom of the constitutional provision itself. The plaintiff 
in error had argued that the tax on carriages was invalid because it 
was direct rather than apportioned. In the course of rejecting this 
argument, Paterson lambasts the drafters of the Constitution for 
their apportionment rules: 
The rule of apportionment . . . is radically wrong; it cannot be supported by any 
solid reasoning. Why should slaves, who are a species of property, be represented 
more than any other property? The rule, therefore, ought not to be extended by 
construction. 
Again, numbers do not alford a just estimate or rule of wealth. It is, indeed, 
a very uncertain and incompetent sign of opulence. There is another reason 
against the extension of the principle laid down in the Constitution. 
Fortunately, Justice Paterson was able to find a better foundation 
for his decision than the Constitution: he "close[d] the discourse 
with reading a passage or two from Smith's Wealth of Nations." 
(What was that about Herbert Spencer's Social Staticf!) 
Had Justice Iredell's opinion been subject to review by the 
current Tenth Circuit, it might never have been published.7 His 
ridicule of the arguments at bar must have caused no little con-
7. The Tenth Circuit recently enjoined the West Publishing Company from printing 
a district court opinion that was critical of several Justice Department attorneys. See Riley, 
Court Blocks Publication of U.S Judge's Opinion, Nat') L.J., Jan. 30, 1984, at 3, col. I. The 
Tenth Circuit later withdrew its order. See Riley, lOth Circuit Vacates No-Publication Or-
der, Nat') L.J., Feb. 6, 1984, at 3, col. I. 
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stemation among the two distinguished lawyers who had been 
hand-picked by the U.S. Attorney General to represent Hylton 
before the Supreme Court.s He restates their argument, and then 
opines: "I should have thought this merely an exercise of ingenu-
ity, if it had not been pressed with some earnestness; and as this 
was done by gentlemen of high respectability in their profession, it 
deserves a serious answer, though it is very difficult to give such a 
one." It takes him just over a page to refute the respectable gen-
tlemen's exercise of ingenuity, although a later scholar has in tum 
questioned the soundness of his reasoning.9 
Imagine Chief Justice Warren reacting to John W. Davis's 
arguments in Brown v. Board of Education by asking whether Da-
vis was joking; Justice Blackmun writing "I am inclined to think 
that the right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a wo-
man's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy, but of 
this I do not give a judicial opinion"; or the dissenters in New 
York Times v. United States questioning the wisdom of the first 
amendment. Life on the eighteenth-century Supreme Court was 
probably more interesting. It was also a lot simpler. 
8. J. GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 779. 
9. Currie, supra note 3, at 856-60. 
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